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OPINION JULY 17, 2026 | The Indian Eye 11

to Indo-Pacific security, including strategy document.
through continued quadrilateral co- IMEC remains largely unbuilt.
operation”. Still, the weight given to The conflicts reshaping West Asia
the relationship is measurably light- have stalled its premise of stable
er than in the 2017 document, which transit routes and normalised Arab–
placed India at the heart of its Asia Israeli relations. The westward pivot
framework. is a bet on a future geography rather
The 2026 National Defense than a present reality. But as a hedge
Strategy, authored under Under Sec- against marginalisation in the east, it
retary Elbridge Colby, organises Asia is the right bet to be making.
policy around “a strong denial de- Conclusion
fence along the First Island Chain”, a
geographic spine running from Japan he retirement of ‘Indo’ from
through Taiwan to the Philippines. a military command is a sym-
The Indian Ocean sits outside it. The Tbol, not a rupture. But symbols
strategy does not mention the Quad. carry information, and this one says
Hegseth’s remarks at the 2026 Shan- something real: American strategy
gri-La Dialogue referred consistently is narrowing towards a Pacific deter-
to “the Pacific”. They described India The US strategy defined the region as stretching “from our Pacific coastline to the Indian rence problem in which India’s geog-
as “a critical anchor in South Asia”, Ocean”, pushing the western boundary further (File photo) raphy matters less than it did when
a useful but unmistakably regional the Indo-Pacific was first conceived.
rather than oceanic in scope. On the Indo-Pacific itself, India
The harder question is wheth- deepen ties with Japan, France, Aus- tories include the principal democ- should keep building what already
er this constitutes a clean break or tralia and Southeast Asian partners racies of three continents, and its works within the Quad: maritime
merely a clarification of what the on India’s own terms. premise is direct: India, positioned domain awareness sharing, critical
Indo-Pacific always was. Was the This position is coherent. But at the junction of the Indian Ocean, minerals cooperation, and technol-
construct ever a genuinely inclu- it should not be mistaken for indif- the Gulf, and the Red Sea approach- ogy partnerships under frameworks
sive regional order, or primarily an ference to what India gained during es, is the indispensable node through like iCET, none of which depend on
anti-China coalition? The ‘Indo’ the Indo-Pacific decade. Sustained which this connectivity must pass. how Washington names its command
carried operational weight so long American engagement brought Surrounding IMEC is a careful- structure. But New Delhi must also
as Washington judged that balanc- technology-transfer commitments, ly assembled lattice of minilateral fix what lies within its own control. A
ing China required a maritime arc maritime-domain awareness part- arrangements. The I2U2 grouping navy that receives the smallest share
extending towards Africa’s eastern nerships, and a seat at consequential with Israel, the UAE and the United of India’s defence budget cannot car-
shores. Once American strategy minilateral tables. The bilateral rela- States, launched in July 2022, opened ry the maritime responsibility India
narrowed to denying China a swift tionship has also grown more trans- with a UAE commitment to invest claims for itself in the Indian Ocean.
military fait accompli near Taiwan, actional, with disputes over tariffs two billion dollars in an Indian food Closing that gap matters more than
India’s geographic position became and India’s continued purchase of park and clean-energy infrastructure. any further joint statement.
peripheral to the core operational Russian energy signalling that Wash- The India–EU Connectivity Partner- The real test of India’s strategic
problem. The construct’s coherence ington’s tolerance for Indian hedging ship of May 2021 ties together digi- seriousness is not whether it keeps its
depended on a particular theory of is not unconditional. A contracting tal, energy and transport links from place on America’s map. It is wheth-
competition. Change the theory, and Indo-Pacific architecture could re- Brussels to Mumbai, positioning In- er India draws a map of its own, one
the map contracts. duce the leverage India once held to dia as the eastern anchor of Europe- in which the Indo-Mediterranean is
Strategic Consequences for India extract concessions in defence tech- an connectivity outreach. not a fallback but a genuine theatre
nology and trade. The gains were In May 2026, Prime Minister built outward from Indian ports, sup-
ndia’s salience to American strat- real; treating their erosion as incon- Narendra Modi and Italian Prime ply chains and alliances. That map is
egy may prove more contingent sequential would be a strategic error. Minister Meloni jointly described the already being sketched out through
Ithan intrinsic. If Washington now The Indo-Mediterranean Moment Indian Ocean and Mediterranean as IMEC, I2U2, and a deepening part-
prioritises allies capable of fighting “regions that cannot be viewed as nership with Europe. Whether New
a Taiwan contingency, India, which he most consequential feature separate spheres but instead as in- Delhi commits the money, the ships,
is neither a treaty ally nor intends to of India’s current statecraft is creasingly interconnected spaces”, and the diplomatic attention needed
become one, sits outside the priority Tnot how it responds to eastern giving the emerging concept of an “In- to finish it is the question that will
circle. That problem is compounded marginalisation but how it is con- do-Mediterranean” theatre its most matter more than anything Washing-
by capacity: India’s naval budget re- structing a western theatre in which authoritative political expression to date. ton decides to call its commands.
ceives the smallest allocation among its centrality is structural rather than The contrast with the Indo-Pacif-
its three services, even as land-border negotiated. ic is instructive. In the Pacific-centric Priyanshu Agarwal is a Doctoral re-
pressures with China and Pakistan The India–Middle East–Eu- vision now ascendant in Washington, searcher at the School of International
absorb resources and limit the mar- rope Economic Corridor (IMEC), India is a valued but peripheral part- Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University,
itime power projection that would launched through an MoU signed at ner whose contributions are welcome New Delhi, India.
give India’s Indian Ocean claims real the G20 New Delhi Summit in Sep- but not load-bearing. Across the In- Views expressed are of the author and
operational weight. tember 2023 by India, the United do-Mediterranean arc, India is the do not necessarily reflect the views of
A competing reading deserves States, the European Union, Sau- point of origin. The corridor cannot
fair treatment. India has consistently di Arabia, the UAE, Jordan, Israel, be built without it. The minilaterals the Manohar Parrikar IDSA or of the
Government of India.
maintained that its strategic auton- France, Germany and Italy, envisions cannot function without it. The EU
omy is a considered doctrine rather rail and shipping links from Indian connectivity framework is premised The full version of this article first ap-
than its absence. From this vantage, ports to European markets via West on India as a productive anchor rath- peared in the Comments section of the
an America less focused on enrolling Asia. The corridor is explicitly posi- er than an end-market. That struc- website (www.idsa.in) of Manohar Par-
India in alliance frameworks may ac- tioned as an alternative to China’s tural centrality is worth more than rikar Institute for Defense Studies and
tually give New Delhi more room to Belt and Road Initiative. Its signa- nominal inclusion in someone else’s Analyses, New Delhi, on July 3, 2026

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